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South Africa and the Aftermath of 
Portugal’s ‘Exemplary’ Decolonization: 
The Security Dimension
Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses and Robert McNamara
UNI-Maynooth
Allister Sparks, in his seminal study of Apartheid, The Mind of South Africa, 
writes: ‘though it occurred five thousand miles away among another people 
in another continent, in South Africa the Portuguese Revolution was an event 
of catalytic importance that changed the whole directional flow of public 
affairs’. 25 April 1974 was, for Sparks, a ‘simultaneous turning point at which 
the Afrikaner revolution created and entered a phase of crisis and decline, and 
at which the black revolution began its rise.’1 The end of the Salazar/Caetano 
New State, and the hurried decolonization that followed, would indeed alter 
dramatically the balance of power in southern Africa, but it took the decision-
makers in Pretoria time to realize this — time that they did not, in fact, possess. 
The purpose of this article is to examine the reaction of those decision-makers 
to the events in Lisbon and, of course, in Mozambique and Angola, and to 
show that there was no coordinated, over-arching response: like other regional 
powers, and even the superpowers, South Africa was caught off guard by the 
‘Carnation Revolution’, and struggled, as the pace of developments increased, to 
identify precisely where its national interests lay, being hampered in its attempts 
by too great a confidence in its ability to survive the ongoing transformation of 
the region, and by internal power struggles.
Before the Revolution
By the late 1960s, South Africa had become firmly convinced of the necessity 
of preserving Portugal’s rule in the latter’s African territories. Isolationist 
premier Henrik Verwoerd had been replaced by John Vorster, who encouraged 
increasing cooperation between both the South African Defence Forces (SADF) 
and the powerful intelligence services under the direction of Henrik van den 
Bergh and their Portuguese and Rhodesian counterparts.2 Military cooperation 
1 Allister Sparks, The Mind of South Africa (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2003), p. 303.
2 See for instance P. Correia, and G. Verhoef, ‘Portugal and South Africa: Close Allies or Unwilling 
Partners in Southern Africa during the Cold War?’, Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Mili-
tary Studies, 37.1 (2009) <http://ajol.info/index.php/smsajms/article/view/48731>. A recent treatment 
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had culminated in October 1970 in Exercise ALCORA, which provided for 
increasingly close staff talks between the militaries of the three countries and 
the development of which accelerated considerably from the autumn of 1973 
until April 1974.3 In this period South Africa and Rhodesia sought ever closer 
military ties, and this desire sparked off a high-level disagreement within 
Portuguese military circles regarding Pretoria’s proposed ‘total strategy’.4 
Nonetheless, as Jamie Miller has recently observed, under ‘Operation Cadiz’, 
launched in September 1973, P. W. Botha, the South African Defence Minister, 
committed South Africa to bankrolling Portuguese counter-insurgency to the 
tune of R150 million over five years.5 Thanks to these funds significant purchases 
— including of French-designed Crotale surface-to-air missiles — were made 
by the Portuguese in the months preceding the April 1974 revolution.6
Despite the coming into being of Exercise ALCORA, and the countless 
threat assessments it produced, there is only scant evidence that South Africa, 
and especially its intelligence services, anticipated the revolution of 25 April 
1974, carried out by the mid-ranking officers of the Armed Forces Movement 
(MFA). In some respects this reflected the inadequacies of BOSS, headed by 
General H. J. van den Bergh, ‘probably the strongest man in the country after 
Vorster’,7 which had increasingly colonized the intelligence field, much to the 
chagrin of the Directorate of Military Intelligence of the SADF. However, there 
is little evidence extant that the Defence Forces’ military and naval attaché, 
their eyes and ears in Lisbon, was any better informed. On the Rhodesian side, 
Ken Flower, head of the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), claimed to 
be sceptical about the long-term survival of the Portuguese empire in Africa, 
of some of these issues can also be found in Jamie Miller ‘Things Fall Apart: South Africa and the 
Collapse of the Portuguese Empire, 1973–74’, Cold War History, 12.2 (2012), 183–204.
3 On Exercise ALCORA, see Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses and Robert McNamara, ‘The Last Throw of 
the Dice: Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa, 1970–1974’, Portuguese Studies, 28.2 (2012), 201–15, as 
well as two forthcoming articles in International History Review: ‘The Origins of Exercise ALCORA, 
1960–1971’, and ‘Exercise ALCORA: Expansion and Demise, 1971–1974’. ALCORA is inserted into a 
wider Portuguese diplomatic strategy in Luís Barroso, Salazar, Caetano e o Reduto Branco: a manobra 
político-diplomática de Portugal na África Austral (1951–1974) (Lisbon: IESM/Fronteira do Caos, 2012).
4 The secret reservations of General Costa Gomes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and second 
post-revolution President of the Republic, can be seen for instance in Paço de Arcos, Arquivo da Defesa 
Nacional, Secretariado Geral da Defesa Nacional, Caixa 7624, ‘Constituição de Forças de Reserva e 
Estratégicas ALCORA’, 25 October 1973. Given the importance of the commitments being entered 
into with South Africa and Rhodesia at the time, it is difficult not to link these commitments to the 
publication, by General António de Spínola (Costa Gomes’ second-in-command and the first post-
revolution President of the Republic), of his famous book Portugal e o Futuro (Lisbon: Arcádia, 1974), 
which argued that the war could not be brought to an end by military means.
5 Miller, ‘Things Fall Apart’, p. 190.
6 ADNPdeA, SGDN, Série 25, Caixa 57, ‘Acordo do empréstimo de 150 milhões de rands firmado com 
a RAS’, 18 September 1975. The deal was alluded to in very vague terms by Silva Cunha in his interview 
with José Freire Antunes (January 1995), and published in the latter’s A Guerra de África, 1961–1974, 2 
vols (Lisbon: Temas e Debates, 1996), i, 333–42.
7 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, vol. xxviii, Southern Africa (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing office, 2011), Doc. 10, Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State, Rogers, 24 June 1969.
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and was despondent when he visited Portugal just before the coup — but this 
prescience was only made public in his memoirs, published long after the 
fact.8
February 1974: A Snapshot of the Threat to the ‘White Redoubt’
ALCORA’s Intelligence Sub-Committee issued a report on the threat to white-
rule southern Africa dated 15 February 1974, which serves to demonstrate the 
dan gers faced by the ALCORA territories in the short, medium and long term, 
as perceived by Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa.9 The report concen-
trated on the African liberation movements, invariably referred to as ‘terro-
rists’, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Communist Bloc and 
the West. Terrorism and subversion, backed by the OAU, was seen to have 
achieved ‘significant successes’ in Rhodesia and Mozambique during 1973.10 
The embargo imposed during the October war in the Middle East by the oil-
pro ducing Arab states, it was noted, had ‘already had a restricting effect on 
the military capabilities of ALCORA’.11 The terrorist threat to Rhodesia was 
likely to grow, and encompass three distinct fronts: across the Zambezi river 
from Zambia by ZAPU; from the Tete district of Mozambique, now partially 
controlled by FRELIMO, by ZANU; and from an increasingly hostile Botswana. 
Even South Africa, despite its cordon sanitaire of Rhodesia and the Portuguese 
territories, might be dragged into the firing line, due to the ‘more militant 
attitude among the Bantu population’, and the growing likelihood of Botswana 
becoming ‘a relatively safe base for infiltrations to the RSA (Republic of South 
Africa) and SWA (South West Africa) in the medium term’. FRELIMO’s 
progress could also lead to South African African National Congress (SAANC) 
terrorist activities in the Northern Transvaal. Angola was likely to see an 
extension of terrorism as well, and the possibility of armed intervention by 
neighbouring states, presumably Zaire, in the oil-rich Cabinda enclave could 
not be ruled out. Mozambique, however, was estimated to be the target selected 
by the OAU ‘among the territories of ALCORA as its primary objective with 
the intention to deny the Portuguese control of the territory. For this purpose 
it is possible that the OAU will exert pressure on FRELIMO to intensify its 
action and on the hostile neighbour countries to grant great support to that 
movement.’12 While there was no immediate threat of large-scale OAU military 
intervention, as it would be hampered by inter-state rivalries, conflicting 
8 Ken Flower, Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record. Rhodesia into Zimbabwe 1964 to 1981 
(London: John Murray, 1987), p. 117.
9 Pretoria, South African National Defence Archive, INT/2 ALCORA 13 ‘Exercise ALCORA: An 
Assessment of the Threat to the ALCORA Territories in the Short, Medium and Long Terms 15 
February 1974’.
10 Ibid, paragraph 5.
11 Ibid, paragraph 7.
12 Ibid, paragraph, 11.
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interests, internal security demands, and cost, the completion of the Tanzania–
Zambia (TANZAM) railway might ‘make support of such force operating 
against the ALCORA Territories more feasible.’13 The threat from the Soviet 
Union and China could also be expected to grow. All this would take place in 
a world where the Western Powers (among which more left-wing governments 
could be expected) were ‘likely to act with indifference bordering on timidity 
so far as support for ALCORA is concerned, despite their apparent revulsion at 
the use of force for political purposes by some sections of the Western World’.14 
In other words, while the external situation was growing bleaker for ALCORA, 
there was no suggestion of imminent collapse from within, and it was surely 
ALCORA’s greatest failing that, in spite of the growing resources put into 
institutional liaison between the militaries of the three countries, South Africa 
and Rhodesia had no advance warning of the military coup in Lisbon.
A Catastrophic Intelligence Failure
South African diplomats and intelligence officials certainly knew trouble was 
brewing in Portugal in early 1974. On 3 January Ambassador Montgomery 
reported rumours of a right-wing coup involving, among others, General 
Kaúlza da Arriaga, a former Commander-in-Chief in Mozambique.15 The first 
concrete sign that the regime of Marcello Caetano was under threat came with 
the publication of General António de Spínola’s book Portugal e o Futuro, which 
started from the premise that there was no military solution to Portugal’s wars 
in Africa, and proposed a much looser, federal, relationship with the colonies. 
After some hesitation in government circles, Spínola and Costa Gomes, the two 
highest-ranking officers in the country’s armed forces, were dismissed after 
refusing to pay homage to the government at a hastily improvised ceremony 
(Costa Gomes having authorized the publication of the work). BOSS sent 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs an intelligence briefing on 20 March 1974 for 
comment. It concluded that Portugal e o Futuro was an attempt to propose an 
Algeria-style Gaullist solution to the colonial wars. However, Caetano’s speech 
of 16 February had rejected Spínola’s federal solution, since Portuguese settlers 
and economic interests would not be respected by the independence movements. 
The brief speculated that Caetano might have encouraged the publication as a 
kite-flying exercise, only to be forced, by the reaction of the right-wing ultras, 
to remove Spínola and Costa Gomes. In any case, the danger had passed.16 This 
completely contradicts the later claim of Eschel Rhoodie, the Secretary of the 
13 Ibid, paragraph 12.
14 Ibid, paragraph, 16.
15 South African Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 1-14-1 Vol. 9 Portugal Political Situation 
and Developments 4.10.72 to 21.5.74, Letter, South African Ambassador in Lisbon to the Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs, Lisbon, 3 January 1974..
16 SADFAP 1-14-1 Vol. 9 Portugal Political Situation and Developments 4.10.72 to 21.5.74, Die 
Sekretaris Van Buitelandse. Portugal: Magstryd In Politieke Kringe, 20 March 1974.
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Department of Information, that Van den Bergh had predicted the coup a year 
before and had informed the CIA, which had sent him a letter of congratulation 
for being the only intelligence organization to anticipate it.17 Moreover, it does 
not tally with the other BOSS documents that occasionally turn up in the files 
of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Immediately after the revolution, for 
example, BOSS issued a memorandum which reflected a relatively sanguine 
attitude to the revolution. Its key conclusion was that:
Despite Spínola’s strong commitment to a political solution, a continued 
Portuguese military presence in Africa seems inevitable for some time. 
If Lisbon does not move in a reasonable length of time, the rebels could 
attempt to step up their activities against the territories, which are not 
capable of maintaining their own defence without substantial help from 
Lisbon. [...] [Guinea] is an economic liability with no hope of producing 
the immediate and long term economic riches of Angola and Mozambique. 
Lisbon is unlikely to risk the loss of Angola and Mozambique, however, and 
the insurgents there are unlikely to accept the type of federation presently 
being considered by Spínola.18
Admittedly, there was a lot of Portuguese reassurance being given to the South 
Africans about the continued commitment to a presence in Africa in the 
aftermath of the coup. The Portuguese Ambassador in Washington informed 
his South African counterpart that, while a revolution was indeed taking place, 
the new regime was led by sober men. João Hall Themido explained, mistakenly, 
that General Spínola, now President of the Republic, was both the leader and 
the catalyst of the revolution (in fact, he turned out to be a relatively powerless 
figurehead, but few realized this at the time); and whilst he could give little 
information about Africa beyond what had been in the press, he believed that 
the regime was sincere when it spoke of a ‘Lusitanian community’. Moreover, 
it was his impression ‘that the chances of orderly devolution in Angola — and 
even in Mozambique — were “fair”. He emphasized that it was not policy to 
capitulate precipitately in Africa.’19 The South African Ambassador in Paris, 
in a despatch in June 1974, mentioned that the French government ‘was like 
ourselves in South Africa, somewhat taken by surprise at the sudden change of 
government in Portugal in April. The conclusion was that the move had been 
well-planned and the coup d’état executed in great secrecy.’20 In other words, the 
situation in Lisbon was nearly impossible to read. But this was not necessarily 
the case. A State Department official, Ellwood Rabenold Jr, presciently referred 
17 Interview with Rhoodie cited in James Saunders, Apartheid’s Friends: The Rise and Fall of South 
Africa’s Secret Service (London: John Murray, 2006), pp. 50–51.
18 SADFAP, 1–14–1 Vol. 10, Portugal Political Situation 27.5.74 to 10.9.74, BOSS to Secretary for For-
eign Affairs, 6 June 1974, enclosing memo ‘Estimate of Portuguese Situation for Mike Glendenhuys’, 
1 May 1974.
19 SADFAP 1–14–1 Vol. 10, Ambassador Washington to Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 4 June 
1974.
20 SADFAP 1–14–9 Vol. 5 Portugal Foreign Policy and Relations 9.11.72 to 30.6.75, Ambassador Paris 
to Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 14 June 1974.
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to conflicting views between those such as Spínola, who favoured a federal 
plan, and others, such as the new Foreign Minister, Mário Soares, whose views 
seemed to align more with the liberation movements.21
South Africa was soon faced with a major new strategic dilemma on its 
northern frontiers as it gradually became clear that Spínola and the National 
Salvation Junta were not free to implement their African policies. Lisbon was 
coming under intense international pressure to move to a straightforward 
handing of power to the liberation movements, while radical elements in 
Portugal, within and without the MFA, saw this kind of ‘exemplary’ decol-
onization as intertwined with their domestic agenda of establishing an avow-
edly revolutionary state. Most importantly, however, the Portuguese army had 
lost the will to fight, thus destroying any possibility of a gradual handover of 
power. For some months, however, the messages emanating from Portugal 
rem ained confused. General Costa Gomes, restored by Spínola to the position 
of Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, visited Africa in May, and rejected the 
idea of immediate independence. While offering an olive branch of partnership 
to the liberation movements, he also claimed that Portugal would fight on to 
safeguard Mozambique if the rebels rejected his offer of talks.22 This turned 
out to be an empty boast. At roughly the same time, moreover, Jorge Jardim, 
the Portuguese settler leader in Mozambique and Salazar’s one-time enforcer in 
Africa, was in Lisbon. The correspondence in the South African files suggests 
that he was attempting to forge links with Pretoria and that General de Toit, 
the head of Military Intelligence, showed some interest.23 Jardim’s activities and 
21 A United States Bureau of Intelligence and Research memorandum speculated that South Africa 
might intervene militarily in southern Mozambique if the Portuguese withdrew precipitately. South 
Africa, it was felt, would tell Washington that white-rule southern Africa had to continue ‘as an 
anti-Communist Bastion’. The memorandum rejected this argument in advance, pointing out that 
‘there is an underlying instability in southern Africa stemming from minority racial rule. The latest 
developments in Lisbon should make this more rather than less apparent as time goes on.’ Department 
of State Central Files, 1973–76, Record Group 59, 040027Z, May 74, ‘INR Assessment of African 
Repercussions of the Portuguese Coup’, 30 April 1974.
22 South African Institute of Race Relations, A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1974 
(Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1975), p. 104.
23 SADFAP 1–113–3 Relations with Mozambique 20.3.65 to 26.5.82, Ambassador Lisbon to Secretary 
Foreign Affairs, 29 May 1974. Jorge Jardim, a former junior minister in the 1950s, and Salazar’s special 
agent in Africa throughout the 1960s, was by now established as a major political and economic 
force in Mozambique. He also provided an important personal link to Malawi’s President, Hastings 
Kamuzu Banda, who named him Malawi’s Consul at Beira. Jardim was the most prominent member 
of a political current, to which his newspapers in the city of Beira gave great coverage, which argued 
that FRELIMO could be persuaded to share power with hastily assembled political parties and settler 
groups. Jardim had, even before the revolution, convinced President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia of 
the merits of a similar programme, which he described as the ‘taming’ of FRELIMO. See his memoirs, 
Moçambique, terra queimada (Lisbon: Intervenção, 1976). An account of Jardim’s action-packed life 
is provided by José Freire Antunes in Jorge Jardim: agente secreto (Venda Nova: Bertrand, 1996). It is 
believed that some white settlers from Mozambique with links to Jardim, including future RENAMO 
leader Orlando Cristina, supplied the Rhodesians with Portuguese police files from which they could 
begin to build up a picture of likely recruits for that opposition organization. On this see Tom Young, 
‘The MNR/Renamo: External and Internal Dynamics’, African Affairs: The Journal of the Royal 
African Society, 89.357 (1990), 491–509 (p. 494).
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his past fed Portuguese suspicions that he was a possible leader of a unilateral 
declaration of independence by settlers, something he denied.24 This was 
causing the South African Ambassador in Lisbon some concern. When Jardim 
finally left Lisbon for Blantyre, Ambassador Montgomery gave a great sigh of 
relief.25 Meanwhile, the South African Ambassador in Paris reported in early 
June 1974 that Mário Soares’ first meeting with Samora Machel of FRELIMO 
had not gone well, as the liberation movement only wished ‘to discuss the 
modalities of a transfer of power to a FRELIMO government.’ According to 
the report, this ‘was unacceptable to the Portuguese government as a whole, 
although some of the politicians in the government adopt a softer line on the 
matter.’26
South Africa’s ability to read the situation clearly was further muddled 
by the fact that Exercise ALCORA continued into the autumn of 1974. 
An ALCORA Top Level Committee (ATLC) meeting was held at the end 
of June in Pretoria. Remarkably, the planning to give ALCORA greater 
solidity through the establishment of the Permanent ALCORA Planning 
Organization (PAPO) continued, and the meeting went through a considerable 
agenda, including weapons procurement, intelligence matters and future 
developments.27 However, it was acknowledged in the report by Major General 
Clifton, Director General Special Plans of PAPO, that morale and productivity 
had suffered as a result of the Portuguese coup.28 It was only in July that the 
political balance of power in Lisbon became clear to the naked eye. That 
month, the first post-revolution government fell, and its replacement, led by 
Colonel Vasco Gonçalves, represented a significant shift to the left, with the 
MFA clearly in the ascendancy and Spínola, correspondingly, in retreat. This, 
allied to the breakdown in the Portuguese army’s discipline, meant that the 
liberation movements in Guinea and Mozambique could ignore Spínola’s 
calls for referendums or pre-independence elections. The very speed of the 
ensuing Portuguese collapse at the negotiating table meant that one obvious 
alternative for South African and Rhodesian strategy, a settler-led counter 
coup, with or without Jardim, never had time to organize itself properly. On 7 
September 1974, when the Lusaka Accord was announced, naming 25 June 1975 
as Mozambique’s independence day, white settlers in Lourenço Marques and 
Beira attempted to rise against it. They attacked black neighbourhoods, freed 
24 See SADFAP 1–14–3 Vol. 1, Portugal relations with SA 15.7.64–13.8.82, South African Embassy 
Lilongwe to Secretary Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 5 Aug 1974.
25 SADFAP 1–113–3 Relations with Mozambique 20 Mar 1965 to 26 May 1982, Ambassador Lisbon to 
Secretary Foreign Affairs, 11 June 1974.
26 SADFAP 1–14–9 Vol. 5 Portugal Foreign Policy and Relations 9.11.72 to 30 .6.75, Ambassador Paris 
to Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 14 June 1974. Soares, of course, was one of those politicians, 
but for the time being he respected the wishes of President Spínola, whose instructions he was follow-
ing. The same cannot be said for his fellow negotiator and future revolutionary pin-up Otelo Saraiva 
de Carvalho, who at one point in the talks sided openly with FRELIMO.
27 SANDFAP, ALCORA 6, Minutes of 7th ATLC Meeting, Pretoria, 24–28 June 1974.
28 Ibid, Annex 1, Report by Director General Special Plans.
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imprisoned DGS (secret police) agents, seized the airport and radio stations, 
and appealed for help among all FRELIMO’s opponents, in Mozambique and 
abroad, but with no success.29 South Africa appears not to have played any 
role in the outbreak, although many of those who took part gathered around 
the South African consulate shouting ‘Viva a África do Sul’. Unimpressed, the 
consul-general in Lourenço Marques suggested that South Africa could gain 
considerable advantage from FRELIMO’s lack of support from different ethnic 
groups ‘provided that we are seen to remain absolutely neutral so that we do not 
engender animosity from any quarter in the country.’30 Vorster, in an interview 
with Newsweek, was dismissive of fears of a black government in Mozambique. 
He was equally dismissive of Portugal’s colonial model:
After all events in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau have proved 
our policy of separate development right. The root of the trouble in all these 
territories was that the Portuguese policy was one of assimilation — which 
was a negation of the nationhood of their people [...] if relations were that 
good why did they fight each other so much? Why are they still fighting? 
Why are the whites running out of Mozambique and Angola?31
This arrogance, this sense of being somehow above the fray and impervious to 
the great currents that had just engulfed the Portuguese colonies, and would 
soon do the same for Rhodesia, was characteristic of South Africa’s political 
masters. Nevertheless the thought of FRELIMO — a Marxist liberation move-
ment — coming to power must have given them cause for concern. FRELIMO’s 
leadership was on the record as saying that it would not cooperate with 
South Africa, even to the extent of denying it electricity from the soon-to-be-
completed Cabora Bassa dam.32 The ALCORA Intelligence documents referred 
to above demonstrate that the South African military feared that Mozambique 
might become a base for the SAANC from which to attack into Northern 
Transvaal.33 However, South Africa showed itself willing, at least initially, to 
follow a conciliatory path; perhaps its leaders simply could not believe that a 
Mozambican government, whatever its political creed, would dare to act against 
Pretoria, given the enormous dependence of the Mozambican economy on South 
African goodwill. Indeed, in May 1974, just a month after the Lisbon revolution, 
Vorster stated, with regard to Mozambique, that he was not worried about ‘the 
colour of the people concerned’; he pledged non-interference in Mozambican 
affairs, and said that South Africa was interested solely in stable government 
29 Malyn Newitt, A History of Mozambique (London: Hurst & Company, 1995), pp. 538–40.
30 SADFAP 1–113–3 Mozambique Relations with SA 20.3.65 to 26.5.82, Consul Lourenço Marques to 
Secretary Foreign Affairs, 16 September 1974 and SADFAP 1–113–3 Vol. 6A Mozambique relations with 
S.A. 10.12.73 to 28.8.74, Consul, Lourenço Marques to Secretary Foreign Affairs, 19 October 1974.
31 Newsweek, 16 September 1974.
32 According to journalist Ray Vicker, Cabora Bassa represented a 450 million dollar investment, 
with most of the money being South African in origin. Wall Street Journal, 7 August 1972.
33 Mário Joaquim Azevedo, ‘A Sober Commitment to Liberation? Mozambique and South Africa, 
1974–1979’, African Affairs, 79.317 (1980), 567–84 (p. 568). See also ‘An Assessment of the Threat to the 
ALCORA Territories’, 15 February 1974, para. 11.
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there.34 Ian Smith, the Prime Minister of Rhodesia, whose sanctions-busting 
strategy was deeply dependent on a friendly Mozambique, discovered that 
Vorster really meant these words when the two met in July. Smith explained 
to Vorster that he had contact with ‘powerful forces in Mozambique’ who 
had a plan to take over Mozambique south of the Zambezi and form a kind 
of Federation with South Africa and Rhodesia. This would allow Rhodesia 
to continue to use the port facilities at Beira. Vorster initially showed interest 
in the plan and said he would consider it and contact Smith on the matter, 
but proved slow to respond. Some months later, he rejected the idea outright, 
having ‘come to the conclusion that there would be an unfavourable reaction 
from the rest of the world, and that therefore they could not support it.’35 While 
Smith is imprecise on the date of the reply, it would appear to have been after 7 
September 1974, the date of the abortive settler uprising in Mozambique which 
had cost some 115 lives.36
Ian Smith and other observers suggest that at this point South Africa had 
already committed itself to a policy of détente with Black Africa, which was 
only officially promulgated by Vorster in the South African parliament in 
October 1974. However, Vorster remained committed to keeping a South 
African Police unit in Rhodesia, arguing that it was there to prevent a terrorist 
threat to South Africa developing.37 And there remain persistent rumours that 
Defence Minister P. W. Botha and the SADF were on the verge of intervening 
in Mozambique around this time, only to be thwarted by BOSS agents.38 
BOSS tended to provide the like-minded Department of Foreign Affairs 
with intelligence material that emphasized the reasonableness of FRELIMO 
and its leader, Samora Machel.39 In any case, FRELIMO had rapidly cooled 
its anti-South Africa rhetoric. In September 1974, the newly installed Prime 
Minister, Joaquim Chissano, made it clear that FRELIMO would not interfere 
with Rhodesia or South Africa and would not be a ‘saviour’ or ‘messiah’ for 
either country’s majority African populations, who would have to resolve their 
respective problems on their own.40
Early in September 1974, Ken Flower, General van den Bergh and Brand 
Fourie, Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, were in Lisbon for 
meetings with the Portuguese. There, António de Almeida Santos, the Minister 
34 Quoted in John Barratt, ‘Detente in Southern Africa’, The World Today: Chatham House Review, 
31.3 (1975), 120–30 (p. 124). See also Vorster on 1 August 1974 in Parliament, Hansard 4 Cols, 1857–60.
35 Ian Smith, Bitter Harvest: The Great Betrayal and the Dreadful Aftermath (London: John Blake, 
1997), pp. 160–61.
36 A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1974, p. 111.
37 Rand Daily Mail, 6 October 1974.
38 Dan O’Meara, Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party (Athens: 
Ohio University Press, 1996), p. 219.
39 See for instance SADFAP 1–113–3 Vol. 6B, Mozambique Relations with SA 3.9.74 to 24.10.74, BOSS 
Memo to Secretary Foreign Affairs, 24 October 1974, containing an astonishingly detailed report on a 
meeting of British Officials and Ministers.
40 Azevedo, ‘A Sober Commitment to Liberation?’, p. 580.
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for Inter-Territorial Coordination, outlined the likely agreement between 
Portugal and FRELIMO that was to be the basis of the Lusaka Accords. General 
van den Bergh gave an absolute assurance that South Africa would not allow 
mercenary forces to be organized in South Africa against Angola or Mozam-
bique and that Jorge Jardim had been warned not to engage in such activities.41 
Flower stayed longest in the Portuguese capital and looked up some of his old 
contacts. These, contrary to the assurances given earlier by Foreign Minister 
Mário Soares, suggested that FRELIMO’s word was worth nothing. And while 
there was talk of a potential right-wing coup in Portugal, which might influence 
the course of events in Angola, it seemed as if the situation in Mozambique 
had developed to a point where there was no turning back.42 Flower was rather 
more forthcoming in his memoirs about his knowledge of what was going on 
in Lisbon, referring to his direct participation in the plotting of a counter-
coup which involved Spínola himself.43 This, presumably, was Spínola’s failed 
attempt to rally the ‘silent majority’ to his side, later that month, which ended 
not with a defeat for the left, but rather the President’s resignation, and led to 
the strengthening of the MFA’s hold over the institutions of the Portuguese 
state.
Picking up the Pieces after Mozambique
Exercise ALCORA ended at a meeting on 14 and 15 October 1974 in Lisbon. 
General J. A. Pinheiro, the assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (a 
position which General Costa Gomes held on to, despite his recent acceptance 
of the Presidency of the Republic), addressed the meeting and made clear that 
ALCORA was over, due to the recent Lusaka agreements with FRELIMO. Not 
even the ‘hot-pursuit’ operations so beloved of Rhodesian forces would be 
allowed any longer. The codename ALCORA was to be dropped and PAPO 
would cease to exist on 31 October 1974. Despite the ending of what had become 
to all intents and purposes a military alliance, the meeting concluded on a 
friendly note, without recrimination.44 Whether as a direct or an indirect result 
of the end of the ALCORA strategy, which had subcontracted out the defence 
of South Africa to the Portuguese military, Vorster’s government stepped up 
its moves towards détente with the rest of Africa. This seems to have informed 
Pretoria’s policy on Mozambique and its decision from October 1974 to pursue a 
policy of pressurizing the Rhodesian government to come to terms with African 
nationalists. By the end of the year, South Africa had, with the cooperation of 
Zambia in particular, negotiated a very shaky ceasefire between the Rhodesian 
41 SADFAP 1–14–3 Vol. 1 Portugal Relations with SA, 15.7.64 to 13.8.82, Meeting in Lisbon, 2 September 
1974, between Dr Almeida Santos, B. G. Fourie and General van den Bergh.
42 SADFAP 1–14–1 Portugal Political situation 27.2.70 to 3.5.84, Representative Salisbury to Secretary 
for Foreign Affairs, 18 September 1974.
43 Flower, Serving Secretly, pp. 144–45.
44 SANDFAP, ALCORA 7, Minutes of the 8th ATLC Meeting, Lisbon 14–15 October 1974.
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government and the liberation movements which opposed it. While various 
negotiations over the next two years — Victoria Falls (August 1975), the 
Kissinger Plan (September 1976), and the Geneva conference (December 1976)45 
— ended in failure, primarily on the rocks of the Rhodesian Prime Minister’s 
intransigence and the serious splits in the liberation movements, they forestalled 
the drift to full-scale war in Rhodesia for nearly two years.
In Pretoria, however, not everyone was convinced of the merits of détente. 
Meeting in February and September 1975 under the auspices of a successor 
liaison group to ALCORA, Rhodesian military and SADF officers produced 
a document on the ‘Military Threat to the Republic of South Africa and 
Rhodesia’.46 Reiterating that the threat stemmed from ‘black political aspirations’ 
supported by the OAU, the Communist Bloc and certain Western countries, it 
concluded that the surrender of effective Portuguese control in Mozambique 
had added momentum to the dangers facing both countries and contributed 
to ‘an aggressive and uncompromising attitude towards the Republic of South 
Africa (RSA) and Rhodesia [...] The white-controlled states of southern Africa 
face the present developing threat in an atmosphere of increasing hostility and 
isolation.’ It was noted that the OAU, which had met in Dar es Salaam in April 
1975, had as its ‘ultimate aim the total elimination of white rule in southern 
Africa.’ There was also concern about President Amin of Uganda, the then 
Chairman of the OAU, and his attempt to revive the concept of an all-Africa 
Army, though it was noted that certain elements in the OAU had reservations 
about Amin’s ‘reputation and unpredictability’. While President Kaunda of 
Zambia was in favour of détente with South Africa, he had made clear that 
any collapse in the negotiations between the African National Council and 
the Rhodesian government not attributable to intransigence on the part of the 
ANC would lead to Zambia supporting whatever course the ANC chose to 
use to attain majority rule.47 Meanwhile, it was concluded that Mozambique’s 
precarious economy precluded any ‘drastic political or economic steps against 
Rhodesia or the RSA’, although its support for ZANU was likely to continue 
and the SAANC was likely to be granted facilities in the near future, if only 
on a low-profile basis. The report concluded that the Movimento Popular de 
Libertação de Angola (MPLA) was best placed to succeed in taking power in 
Angola. The strategy of détente was useful in preventing revolutionary aims 
and had led to some new political thinking in some African states ‘which had 
curbed the activities of terrorist organisations.’ Conversely, however, it had 
45 See for instance, R. W. Johnson, How long will South Africa survive? (London: Macmillan, 1977), 
pp. 1–16; Sue Onslow, ‘ “We must gain time”: South Africa, Rhodesia and the Kissinger Initiative of 
1976’, South African Historical Journal, 56 (2006), 123–53 and Ian Smith, Bitter Harvest, pp. 160–222. 
There is a huge volume of correspondence on these events in the Ian Smith Papers at Cory Historical 
Library, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa in Box 4–0006 M (Official Communications 
with South Africa, Volumes 1–7).
46 SANDFAP, ALCORA 13, ‘The Military Threat to the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia’, 
September 1975.
47 ‘The Military Threat to the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia’, 24 September 1975, paragraph 7.
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‘adversely affected the counter terrorist campaign in Rhodesia’.48 The instability 
engendered by the collapse of Portuguese power, ‘especially the instability 
in Angola and Mozambique’, had ‘resulted in Communist countries and 
Communist organizations intensifying their efforts to exploit and manipulate 
the conflict situation as whole, to gain initiative and influence.’49
On 21 October 1975, a Portuguese diplomat based at the Permanent 
Representation to the United Nations reported that Portugal had no intention 
of handing over power solely to the MPLA. This official also suggested that 
Mozambique had plans to initiate discussions with South Africa regarding 
the establishment of diplomatic relations with Pretoria, as it was feeling the 
economic pinch from the loss of tourist revenue.50 At least in the immediate 
aftermath of Mozambique’s independence, South Africa appeared to have 
reached a modus vivendi with its newly independent neighbour. However, this 
would change. FRELIMO’s escalating support for ZANU in its war against 
Rhodesia, particularly after the failure of Vorster’s détente initiative and the 
Kissinger Plan by the end of 1976, would see Mozambique become the major 
target of Rhodesian retaliation. This included a series of military assaults against 
ZANU-controlled guerrilla and refugee camps and the aiding and abetting of 
the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), which waged a terrifyingly 
brutal war against FRELIMO and the civilian population of Mozambique. The 
end of Rhodesia in early 1980 would see South Africa take over the aiding of 
RENAMO from the Rhodesian CIO ‘lock, stock and barrel’ in order to pressure 
Mozambique not to back any of the South African liberation movements.51 
South African agents also carried out a series of raids and bombings on ANC 
activists. The Nkomati Accord (1984) forced FRELIMO to shut the ANC 
office in Mozambique in return for a South African pledge to stop support for 
RENAMO. However, relations remained strained and when President Samora 
Machel was killed in a plane crash in South Africa, in 1986, many believed it 
was the work of South African agents.52 Still, South Africa had at least avoided 
being dragged into conflict in Mozambique in 1974–75. The same was not true 
of Portugal’s other major colony in southern Africa, Angola.
The Intervention in Angola
The intervention in Angola was, according to Colin Legum, an exiled South 
African journalist, ‘possibly the most traumatic event in South Africa’s history 
since the Anglo-Boer war at the turn of the century.’53 South African troops had 
48 Ibid, paragraph 11.
49 Ibid, paragraph 12.
50 SADFAP 1–14–1 Vol. 12 Portugal Political Situation and Developments 6.5.75 to 31.10.1975, SA 
mission New York, 23 October 1975.
51 Flower, Serving Secretly, p. 262.
52 See Saunders, Apartheid’s Friends, pp. 218–21.
53 Colin Legum and Tony Hodges, After Angola: The War over Southern Africa (London: Holmes & 
Meier, 1976), p. 35.
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been committed to a conflict in southern Africa and some of its soldiers had 
been taken prisoner. However, South African strategy in Angola developed very 
slowly and with considerable reluctance. While, on the one hand, there was less 
of an economic imperative to reach an understanding with whoever emerged 
triumphant in Angola, on the other, the situation in Angola was very different 
to the one which had played itself out so quickly in Mozambique. Spínola had 
been able to retain a say in Angolan affairs until September 1974, trying to 
preserve, there at least, his vision of a Lusitanian community; the much larger 
white settler population seemed determined to stay in the territory, and capable 
of doing so; and the presence of three liberation movements, each with its own 
international connections, contributed massively to this incredibly complex 
situation, fraught with dangers but also with opportunities. The consul-general 
in Luanda, Emmett ‘Mike’ Malone, differentiated little between the three 
competing liberation movements in his reportage. He noted, for instance, that 
the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) Minister of the Interior 
in the transitional government that was established by the January 1975 Alvor 
accords had issued a bellicose statement claiming the SADF was in the process 
of seeking a pretext for invading Angola.54 All three movements seemed to 
be responsible, he explained, for the chaos that engulfed Angola in general, 
and Luanda in particular, as Portuguese power disintegrated throughout 1975, 
undermined by domestic politics, the army’s state of mind, and international 
pressure. This included shooting at South African Airways flights, which ended 
their service in Luanda, an important stopover on the way to Europe and the 
Americas.55 As late as June 1975, the United States did not see any preparations 
for South African intervention.56
South Africa’s invasion of Angola has generated a considerable literature.57 
54 SADFAP 1–22–3 Vol. 5 Angola Relations with SA, 5.3.75. to 25.7.75, Consul-General Luanda to 
Secretary Foreign Affairs, 18 April 1975 and 23 April 1975. The Minister for the Interior (FNLA) repeated 
such accusations in July: see Secretary for Foreign Affairs to SA Legation Lisbon, 11 July 1975.
55 SADFAP 1–22–3 Vol. 5 Angola Relations with S.A., 5.3.75. to 25.7.75, Discussion with High 
Commissioner Cardoso, 16 April 1975.
56 See attachment to Doc. 113, Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, 27 June 1975, in 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, vol. xxviii, Southern Africa.
57 On South Africa, in particular, Robin Hallett, ‘The South African Intervention in Angola, 1976’, 
African Affairs, 77.308 (July 1978), 347–86; Deon Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African 
Foreign Policy Making (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), pp. 75–84; Dan O’Meara, Forty Lost Years, 
pp. 209–29; James P. Barber and John Barratt, South Africa’s Foreign Policy: The Search for Status 
and Security, 1945–1988 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 186–96. See also John A. 
Marcum, ‘Lessons of Angola’, Foreign Affairs, 54.3 (1976), 407–25. More recent accounts of value include 
Edward George, The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale 
(London: Frank Cass, 2005), pp. 49–115 and P. Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, 
Pretoria (Alberton, South Africa: Galago, 2002), pp. 230–347. On the role of the United States, Thomas 
J. Noer, ‘International Credibility and Political Survival: The Ford Administration’s Intervention 
in Angola’, Presidential Studies Quarterly, 23.4 (1993), 771–85, provides a useful summation of the 
literature. Important memoirs include Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1999); John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (New York: Norton, 1978); and 
Magnus Malan, My Life with the SADF (Pretoria: Protea, 2006). Two works, sympathetic to the SADF, 
essential for the military aspects are S. du Preez, Avontuur in Angola: Die Verhaal van Suid-Afrika 
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The standard narrative is straightforward, but somewhat misleading. South 
Africa appears to have done little in Angola until August 1975, when workers 
involved in construction of the Calueque Dam complex on Cunene River, about 
20km from the Namibian frontier, came under threat from some or all of the 
liberation movements, as Portuguese power in Angola drained away. This led 
to a small force of SADF troops occupying the complex. Then, in the middle 
of October, South African forces moved northwards, supposedly in hot pursuit 
of guerrillas, but in reality to prevent the Soviet and MFA-backed MPLA from 
coming to power. Considerable debate has raged over whether or not this was 
done with the blessing of the United States. Days before 11 November 1975, 
the date set at the Alvor talks for Angolan independence, the South Africans 
were close to Luanda but chose, puzzlingly, not to attempt to seize it, although 
they did aid, with air and artillery support, the disastrous FNLA offensive on 
Luanda from the north, which was broken up by a small force of Cuban and 
MPLA troops. Cuba, alarmed by the South African advance, soon went from 
deploying a relatively modest number of advisers to the MPLA to rushing 
tens of thousands of front-line soldiers into Angola. With the United States 
unwilling to provide much practical or moral cover after Congress had banned 
all financial aid to Angola, overt or covert, through the Clark Amendment of 
19 December 1975, the SADF began a withdrawal southwards in mid-December 
1975, shadowed all the way by the Cubans and the MPLA. By March 1976, the 
SADF had left Angola. Of its allies, the FNLA had been broken and the União 
Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) relegated to a guerrilla 
force. To its supporters, the SADF, betrayed by a decadent United States suffering 
from a Vietnam syndrome, remained undefeated. To its detractors, however, it 
had narrowly avoided a military catastrophe at the hands of a superior Cuban 
expeditionary force.
South African Decision-Making
How did it all go so wrong for Pretoria? According to one account, South 
Africa appears to have considered encouraging the development of irredentism 
among the major tribal grouping in southern Angola and Northern Namibia, 
perhaps creating a Great Ovambo state that would act as a buffer between it and 
the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), which stepped up its 
activities in the face of the vacuum left behind by the Portuguese. Such a move 
was greatly feared by all three Angolan liberation movements.58 Nevertheless, 
South African officials met with representatives of the three major liberation 
movements seeking concrete assurances that they would respect the border 
se Soldate in Angola, 1975–1976 (Pretoria: Van Schaik, 1989) and F. J. du T. Spies, Operasie Savannah: 
Angola 1975–1976 (Pretoria: SADF Directorate of Public Relations, 1989).
58 Hallett, ‘The South African Intervention in Angola, 1976’, pp. 351–52.
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and by implication not support the developing SWAPO campaign.59 The 
Financial Times, indeed, claimed that the MPLA had reportedly acquiesced in 
this demand. In July 1975, a South African general, D. R. Marais, was quoted 
as claiming that two to three thousand SWAPO cadres were being trained in 
southern Angola, although this claim was swiftly debunked by another senior 
officer. However, SWAPO attacks led to South African cross-border incursions 
into Angola, which apparently involved the SADF in clashes with SWAPO, 
MPLA and UNITA forces.60 Meanwhile, in April 1975, the South African 
government had asked the Portuguese High Commissioner to Angola to take 
action to protect the workers involved in the construction of the abovementioned 
Calueque Dam on the Cunene River. In May 1975, an alarmist SADF report 
advocated increased support for the FNLA and UNITA to forestall the MPLA. 
After the failure of Portuguese authorities to take action, the SADF deployed a 
platoon which seized control of the complex.61
However, sometime in the autumn of 1975, Pretoria decided to become more 
deeply involved in the developing Angolan conflict. It is usually assumed that 
the Angolan intervention was primarily driven by P. W. Botha and the SADF, 
since it ran contrary to the détente strategy favoured by the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and General van den Bergh’s BOSS, which appeared to have 
paid off in Mozambique. Crucially, then, the intervention in Angola fitted 
into a wider context of inter-departmental turf wars within the South African 
security and diplomatic establishment for control of foreign and defence policy. 
Escheel Rhoodie, Secretary of the Department of Information, later sacked in 
disgrace for his role in the Information Scandal (‘Muldergate’), was in the 1970s 
a close ally of Van den Bergh. Rhoodie claims that in August 1975, without the 
approval of Vorster or the Cabinet, P. W. Botha sent South African troops to 
guard the Calueque hydro-electric plant and that this developed into a hot-
pursuit operation against guerrilla groups that extended nearly to Luanda 
by November 1975. In this version, the invasion’s ‘pursue-to-Luanda’ strategy 
became a fait accompli.62 Somewhat in support of this, Deon Geldenhuys 
suggests that a lethargic John Vorster was consulted by Botha but had little 
input into the military campaign, which appears to have been ad hoc and 
opportunistic rather than working to any overarching strategy.63 The Defence 
establishment was able to elbow the Department of Foreign Affairs aside over 
Angola under Vorster’s rather ‘unstructured decision-making’.64 However, 
Jamie Miller, citing a range of South African sources and interviews, suggests a 
59 Spies, Operasie Savannah, pp. 60–65.
60 Hallett, ‘The South African Intervention in Angola, 1976’, pp. 351–52.
61 According to the account given by P. W. Botha to the House of Assembly, 26 January 1976, Hansard 
1 Cols 44–52.
62 See Eschel M. Rhoodie, P. W. Botha: The Last Betrayal (Melville: S. A. Politics, 1989), pp. 194–96. 
Apart from Rhoodie, the Muldergate scandal also claimed the careers of John Vorster (by then State 
President) and Connie Mulder, the Minister for Information (who was heir apparent to Vorster).
63 Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation, pp. 75–84; O’Meara, Forty Lost Years, pp. 220–21.
64 Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation, p. 82.
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gradual escalation of South African involvement beginning with arms, border 
crossings, training and eventual intervention, with Botha and SADF leading the 
charge over the heads of BOSS and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.65
The Portuguese initially complained about this Calueque occupation, 
although their inability to protect the facility meant that they were forced to 
tolerate it. Still, they requested that South Africa do everything possible ‘to 
avoid any direct confrontations.’66 It would appear that the SADF began to 
engage MPLA forces at this time and the Lisbon press, notably the communist-
leaning Diário de Notícias, suggested that a full-scale South African invasion 
was underway, which the Embassy in Lisbon denied.67 In September, Portuguese 
officials met a senior South African officer, General Armstrong, to discuss the 
situation in southern Angola. They were happy to allow the SADF to occupy 
the dam but believed that control should be ceded to the MPLA in due course. 
They brought with them a message that the MPLA wanted normal relations 
with South Africa and would honour the contract for the dam. The Portuguese 
emphasized that the MPLA was the only party that really counted and that 
it had more ‘brains’ than the others, as it commanded the allegiance of all 
the black professional class.68 At this stage the scope of the South African 
intervention remained limited and arguably defensible. The country’s military 
was protecting an important asset, into which South African resources had 
been poured, in the absence of the Portuguese, who were no longer capable 
of doing so. In truth, South Africa no longer cared about Portuguese sensi-
bilities. In a contemptuous report, drafted in August 1975, the military attaché 
in Lisbon concluded,
The importance of Portugal is over-estimated. If Angola is handed to the 
MPLA, which is expected shortly, the communist [sic] would be celebrating 
a big victory since such a move would be irrevocable. The communists 
in Portugal are at the moment holding on until the UDI for Angola is 
established, after which, Portugal may go either way, being of no real 
importance anyway. The goals of the Communists were Mozambique and 
Angola and not Portugal. Mozambique irrevocable [sic] an established 
communist state and Angola well on its way.69
At this stage, the Department of Foreign Affairs and BOSS remained firmly 
opposed to military intervention, as was notable from an inter-departmental 
65 See Jamie Miller ‘Yes, Minister: Reassessing South Africa’s Intervention in the Angolan Civil War, 
1975’, Journal of Cold War Studies, forthcoming, passim. The authors are grateful to Jamie Miller for 
an advance copy.
66 SADFAP 1–122–3 Vol. 6 Angola Relations with SA, 26.7.75 to 13.11.75, Brand Fourie, Secretary 
Department of Foreign Affairs to Admiral Biermann, Chief of SADF, 21 August 1975.
67 SADFAP 1–122–3 Vol. 6 Angola Relations with SA, 26.7.75 to 13.11.75, Ambassador Lisbon to 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 3 September 1975.
68 SADFAP 1–122–3 Vol. 6 Angola Relations with SA, 26.7.75 to 13.11.75, Memo on Relations with 
Angola, 24 September 1975.
69 SANDFAP HSI AMI Groep 3 Houer 461, MI/LIA/1/ 1/4 Military Attaché Lisbon to Chief of Staff 
Intelligence, ‘Portugal: Forecast with Reference to Angola’, 18 August 1975.
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meeting on 11 August 1975. Botha had received authorization from Vorster but 
remarkably neither Fourie nor Van den Berg was consulted for their view.70 
The occupation of the dam hardly constituted a major intervention but the very 
fact that the SADF were occupying a part of Angola brought Pretoria into the 
maelstrom of a post-colonial state in a process of disintegration. The Defence 
Forces’ willingness to recruit ex-DGS agents and their private army, the 
fearsome Flechas, to bolster the anti-MPLA force being assembled in the south 
of Angola reflects this. It was also clear that the MPLA was going to win unless 
sufficient Western or South African aid could be brought to bear in support of 
its rival factions.
Sometime in the late autumn of 1975, the various competing blocs in the South 
African governmental apparatus began to coalesce around an interventionist 
strategy. Firstly, after initially not being especially discriminating about the 
liberation movements of Angola, South African officials had begun to make 
contact with both Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA and Holden Roberto’s FNLA. There 
are reports that General van den Bergh, the head of BOSS, had met the MPLA 
dissident leader, Daniel Chipenda, for three days of talks at Windhoek, in July 
1975.71 International circumstances certainly seemed to be pushing South Africa 
towards bolder action. The Mobutu regime in Kinshasa and President Kaunda 
in Lusaka, important partners in Vorster’s proposed détente, were increasingly 
concerned about the MPLA coming to power. Moreover, US Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger, alerted to the situation by Kaunda, had become increasingly 
committed to frustrating the MPLA’s intentions. Convinced that this was a 
test of America’s mettle after the recent fall of South Vietnam to the North 
Vietnamese, Kissinger rejected the advice to stay on the sidelines offered by 
both the State Department and the CIA, relatively sanguine about the possibility 
of the MPLA winning. However, the US decision to step up covert aid to the 
FNLA appears to have had a dual effect. On the one hand, it led to increased 
Soviet and Cuban support for the MPLA; on the other, it convinced South 
Africa that a successful intervention might rekindle relations with the United 
States. Again according to Rhoodie, General van den Bergh, after meeting with 
Holden Roberto, probably in October 1975 at Mobutu’s palace in Kinshasa, 
told the South African cabinet that the CIA would support a pincer attack on 
Luanda by the FNLA from the north, and by South Africa and Jonas Savimbi’s 
UNITA from the south.72 This meeting tallies, chronologically at least, with 
the expansion of the South African military mission from defending Calueque 
to attempting to frustrate the MPLA’s coming to power. It also suggests that 
70 SADFAP 1–22–3 Vol. 6 Angola Relations with SA, July to November 1975, Meeting on Calueque 
Dam, 11 August 1975.
71 Hallett, ‘The South African Intervention in Angola, 1976’, p. 354.
72 This is according to Eschel Rhoodie, quoted in Mervyn Rees and Chris Day, Muldergate: The Story 
of the Info Scandal (Johannesburg: Macmillan, 1980), p. 195. The CIA, as late as June 1975, according to 
DCI William Colby, was unwilling to get involved with the South Africans. See Doc 113, ‘Minutes of a 
National Security Council Meeting’, 27 June 1975, in FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. xxviii, Southern Africa.
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the invasion, rather than being simply a Botha-directed solo run, in fact had 
wide support from among South Africa’s most significant senior ministers. 
Gen eral Magnus Malan, the chief of the South African army, reports that a 
gov ern ment order was given to launch ‘Operation Savannah’ on 15 October. 
The objectives were somewhat open to interpretation: to protect the interests of 
South Africa and SWA, to aid the FNLA and UNITA, and promote détente in 
southern Africa. There was no explicit ‘march-on-Luanda’ instruction given.73 
It would also appear that the intervention was to be highly secret, so as to spare 
the blushes of UNITA/FNLA and those African states which wished to see the 
MPLA stopped. There was also the problem that South Africa’s laws banned the 
deployment of the SADF national servicemen outside the country’s borders.74 
Soldiers were initially uniformed as mercenaries.
Declassified South African documents give no definitive rationale about 
the decision-making behind Pretoria’s intervention. If, as seems likely, it was 
opportunistic, haphazardly organized, and had no clear grand strategy behind 
it, then maybe no documentary rationale is extant. The British Ambassador to 
South Africa nevertheless attempted to summarize, post facto, Vorster’s aims:
a) to prevent MPLA from acceding to power in Luanda or, conversely, of 
giving UNITA and FNLA a chance of taking a major share in government 
as successors to the Portuguese;
b) to prevent any further supply of Russian weapons to MPLA by seizing the 
main entry port for these supplies in Luanda;
c) if objective (a) failed, to help UNITA establish control over the Benguela 
Railway and so re-open it for use by Zaire and Zambia, two countries with 
which South Africa was trying to establish a position of influence as part 
of the détente policy;
d) in the process to eliminate SWAPO bases in southern Angola.
This diplomat added, ‘the South African Government must have hoped to 
achieve these results quickly, and secretly, in close collaboration with Dr Savimbi 
of UNITA and with some tacit, but for obvious reasons unacknowledged, 
support from Zaire and Zambia.’75
The American Link
South Africa was motivated by opportunism: its initial thrusts with relatively 
tiny forces brought great rewards as the MPLA’s military wing, the FAPLA, 
was rapidly swept aside and the SADF was, at one stage, a mere hundred miles 
from Luanda. However, its Achilles heel was that it depended on the small 
and well-trained SADF force not running into anything more formidable than 
inexperienced FAPLA troops. Should the SADF encounter anything stronger, 
73 Malan, My Life with the SADF, p. 118.
74 See Hilton Hamann, Days of the Generals (Cape Town: Zebra, 2001), pp. 32–33.
75 The National Archives UK, Kew, London (TNAUKKL), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
51–425, Cape Town to James Callaghan, 9 February 1976, ‘South Africa and Angola — The Penalties 
of Intervention’.
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like Cuban or Soviet personnel, Pretoria hoped it might rely on the support of 
the United States. While Western and South African propaganda suggested that 
the Cuban intervention was merely a proxy for the Soviet Union, most recent 
writing on the event, based on Cuban archives and accounts, suggests that the 
massive deployment of Cuban forces after November 1975 was motivated by 
Cuba’s own desire to save a sympathetic regime (MPLA) from total defeat. In 
reality, South Africa’s intervention was catastrophic on every level. Militarily it 
failed to achieve its objective of capturing Luanda. Sufficient numbers of Cuban 
troops stiffened the MPLA, which allowed them to rout an FNLA offensive on 9 
November.76 The idea of a pincer movement on Luanda by the FNLA, UNITA 
and the SADF, which had so excited General van den Bergh in Kinshasa, was 
now a dead letter. The SADF contingent, which might have been sufficient to 
take care of the MPLA on its own, now faced the danger of a rapidly growing 
Cuban military force armed with heavy weapons, particularly artillery — the 
terrifying ‘Stalin’s Organs’ rocket launchers — that outranged the World War 
II-vintage guns of the South Africans. In any case South Africa, according to 
Malan, had decided to stay in Angola either until 11 November (Independence 
Day) or the OAU meeting which was to decide the key question of which 
competing Angola government to recognize. However, it was not until the end 
of the year that a final decision to pull back was made and this was chiefly 
motivated by developments in the United States.
Washington turned out to be an unreliable ally. It was now paralysed as 
President Ford and Secretary Kissinger found that their ability to support 
South Africa was compromised by a general unwillingness to be too closely 
assoc iated with Apartheid. However, they did not want South Africa to pull 
out of Angola, as a conversation between senior Administration officials on 21 
November 1975 reveals:
William Colby (Director, CIA): [South Africa would] like to get their 
troops out, and hire mercenaries. They say that they don’t have the 
money to do this and have turned to us. I think that this is political 
dynamite. The press would be after us. They and Africans would say 
that the MPLA is supported by the big, brave Russians, while the others 
are backed by the bad South Africans and Americans. That would be 
unpleasant.
Joseph Sisco (State Department): More than that. Your description is too 
mild. [...] I do not favor giving any support to the South Africans. [...] 
We would not want to discourage them, but leave them to their own 
devices.
Brent Scowcroft (National Security Council): We do not want to dis-
courage them.77
76 South African artillery was airlifted especially for this purpose and took part in the battle, but 
could do little to stop the rout. This has been often described. An official South African perspective 
can be found in Malan, My Life with the SADF, pp. 124–26.
77 FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. xxviii, Southern Africa, Doc. 139, ‘Memorandum for the Record’, 
Washington, November 21, 1975, 40 Committee Meeting.
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The extent of the assurances the United States gave South Africa and how 
much they encouraged its intervention remains unclear and has not really 
been cleared up by the recent release of the relevant Foreign Relations of the 
United States volume on southern Africa between 1969 and 1976.78 Donald 
Easum, the former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, who was 
disliked and ignored (like much of the State Department) by Henry Kissinger 
for being overly sympathetic to black Africa, was of the view that the Secretary 
of State had used ‘back-channel’ business contacts to encourage P. W. Botha 
to intervene in Angola, probably in October.79 This should be contrasted with 
Kissinger’s own account — ‘South Africa had opted for intervention without 
prior consultation with the United States’ — a view surprisingly endorsed by 
John Stockwell, a dissident CIA officer, in his hostile account of the American 
intervention in Angola.80
The South African Ambassador in Washington, R. F. ‘Pik’ Botha, was well 
aware that the Ford administration was torn between wishing to stop the 
Soviets and Cubans winning while simultaneously wishing to remain distant 
from South Africa, in the face of a growing backlash in Congress. However, his 
understanding of events in Angola was mainly shaped by watching the fighting 
on the US networks, as he appears to have been given little information about 
what was going on from Pretoria. Domestically, South African intervention 
was blanketed in extraordinary secrecy, with no reports on radio or in the 
newspapers. Eventually Pik Botha was informed by Foreign Minister Hilgard 
Muller that the SADF mission had support at the highest levels in Washington. 
Pik Botha demurred, warning nevertheless that an imminent Senate vote 
would cut off funding.81 When he informed Vorster of this, the Prime Minister 
refused to believe him. Muller told the US Ambassador on 15 December 1975 
that the South African view, based on their information, was that, psycho-
logically speaking, the ideal moment for the US and the Western Powers to 
78 FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. xxviii, Southern Africa, passim.
79 The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 
interview with Donald B. Easum, Published 17 January 1990, Library of Congress, Manuscript 
Division, Washington, DC 20540 USA, Digital ID mfdip 2004eas01 <http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/
mfdip.2004eas01>: ‘In fact, there’s been a lot of suspicion all along the line that he had friends and 
connections, and that he permitted certain information to flow independently of official State 
Department channels to Vorster. I don’t know this for a fact, but when the South Africans invaded 
Angola massively in what I think was called the Proteus invasion in October of 1975, there are many 
people who believe that he let — was it then Botha? He let Botha know through business contacts, or 
whatever, that Botha would be supported if he did that. And when Botha didn’t get that kind of US 
military support, Botha was downcast, and said he’d been betrayed by the Americans. And many of us 
think that Kissinger, for whatever reason, couldn’t follow through on pledges he had made.’
80 Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p. 821, John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, p. 186. However, 
Stockwell accused the CIA of cooperation with the South Africans, passim. Kissinger seemed to 
suggest the CIA as one of the major sources of leaks that holed the entire operation below the waterline. 
See Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p. 827.
81 See the extensive excerpts from an interview with R. F. Botha in South African Democracy 
Education Trust, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 2 [1970–1980] (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 
University of South Africa, 2007), pp. 65–68.
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apply ‘maximum pressure’ had arrived.82 A couple of days prior to this, Edward 
W. Mulcahy, the acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, had 
specifically claimed that the US administration had support in the Senate, and 
even the House of Representatives, to continue aid. Indeed Mulcahy informed 
the South Africans that he had gone out of his way to give a sympathetic 
rendering of South Africa’s case over Namibia and Pretoria’s other problems 
to Senator Dick Clark, who, according to the Embassy, had found it ‘very 
interesting and even remarkable.’83 However, Congress was opposed to any 
possibility of being sucked into the southern African conflict, particularly as 
it was clear that much of the administration — most notably CIA Director 
William Colby — saw little difference between the Angolan factions, and on 19 
December 1975 the Clark Amendment stopped all US aid to FNLA and UNITA, 
so destroying the credibility of those in the South African government who had 
claimed to have US backing.84 As an American official ruefully noted: ‘The key 
to keeping our side in Angola from collapsing is So. Africa. As far as Africans 
are concerned they would agree to have So. Africa clean up Angola, but we 
couldn’t pay the domestic price in this country.’85
When the Clark Amendment was passed, Pik Botha was recalled for 
consultations at Vorster’s Eastern Cape holiday home, along with other senior 
ministers and advisers. They met on New Year’s Eve 1975 to discuss strategy 
in the light of the new developments, which included the withdrawal of US 
support and the capture of a small number of SADF troops. No official account 
of this meeting has surfaced. Pik Botha, in any case, found that the Chief of 
the South African Army, Magnus Malan, was now the chief proponent of an 
orderly withdrawal as there was ‘a danger of encirclements and major battles.’ 
The consensus of the meeting was that withdrawal had to begin.86 Politically, 
the intervention had failed, since its very occurrence had gravely discredited 
Pretoria’s Angolan allies, the FNLA and UNITA. African countries that had 
sat on the fence regarding recognition of the MPLA, such as Nigeria, Algeria, 
Ethiopia, Tanzania, the Sudan and Ghana, all ended up recognizing the MPLA 
government when the extent of South African intervention became clear. The 
OAU condemned the intervention. Furthermore, the support of the United 
States proved transient as Congress cut off supplies and money to the FNLA 
and UNITA; Vorster, P. W. Botha, and Nationalist Party MPs all expressed 
 
82 SADFAP 1–22–3 Vol. 7 Angola Relations with SA 24.10.75 to 31.12.75, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 
Pretoria to SA Embassy Washington, 15 December 1975.
83 SADFA 1–22–3 Vol. 7 Angola Relations with SA 24.10.75 to 31.12.75, SA Embassy Washington to 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 12 December 1975.
84 Thomas J. Noer, ‘International Credibility and Political Survival’, p. 778.
85 FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. xxviii, Southern Africa, Doc. 156, ‘Memorandum of Conversation’, 
Washington, 19 December 1975, note 5 for deputy Secretary of State, Ingersoll’s note.
86 See Malan, My Life with the SADF, pp. 130–31, whose account tallies with Pik Botha’s in The Road 
to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 2, pp. 65–68.
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great bitterness about this betrayal in the South African Parliament.87 Lastly, 
it was made clear, as South Africa prepared to confront the Cubans, that the 
United States could not openly support the apartheid regime. Faced with 
international isolation and potential military disaster, the South Africans 
retreated before a major confrontation with the Cuban expeditionary force 
could develop. In the early weeks of 1976, with the SADF in full retreat, the 
Cubans and the MPLA captured all the major towns of central and southern 
Angola, though they behaved with circumspection and did not attempt to 
engage the South Africans.88 Neither did they attempt to push into South West 
Africa. In early March, through the mediation efforts of the British, the Soviets 
and the Nigerians, the South Africans received assurances that the Calueque 
dam would be respected.89 In the end, South Africa’s withdrawal was only 
temporary and it found itself dragged into a border war that would rage until the 
end of the 1980s on the Namibian–South African frontier.90 More importantly, 
however, the perception of the defeat of the invincible South African military 
machine contributed to an uprising in the townships, beginning with Soweto in 
1976, that would rage until the end of Apartheid in the 1990s.
Conclusion
Portugal’s hurried (and, in the Angolan case, opaque) decolonization in 
1974–75, and South Africa’s inept response, represented an existential threat 
to the Apartheid regime, but its leaders did not yet realize this. The nearest 
thing to a post-mortem we have on the Angolan debacle is a report for the 
liaison committee of senior South African and Rhodesian military officers, 
which appears to have replicated at least some of the old functions of 
Exercise ALCORA.91 The aim of the report was to reassess the threat to the 
two remaining white regimes in the aftermath of the new reality of ‘direct 
intervention by a foreign power which had now been established’.92 With regard 
to Soviet objectives in southern Africa, it noted: ‘There can be little doubt 
that the USSR would not have escalated the war in Angola had the USA and 
the Western World shown any determination to counter Soviet involvement.’ 
Soviet objectives included the neutralization of South Africa’s détente policy, 
‘which was proving an embarrassment to them’, and gaining a foothold in 
Angola, to offset Western and Chinese influence in Africa, securing riches and 
87 Hallett, ‘The South African Intervention in Angola, 1976’, p. 383.
88 Ibid.
89 Botha in The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 2, p. 68.
90 See George, The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991, and Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: 
Havana, Washington, Pretoria.
91 SANDFAP, HIS AMI Groep 3 Houer 404, ‘Minutes of discussions between delegations from 
Rhodesian Security Forces and SADF held in Pretoria during the period 26–27 February 1976’.
92 SANDFA, HIS AMI Groep 3 Houer 404, ‘The Effect of the Developments in Angola on the Security 
Situations of Rhodesia and the RSA’, paragraph 2.
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strategic raw materials in Angola, and expanding its maritime influence in 
the southern oceans.93 The USSR had virtually achieved its main objective in 
Angola and a period of consolidation could be expected. An escalation beyond 
the borders would put a strain on Soviet resources. The continued technical 
responsibility of Britain for Rhodesia and South Africa’s control of South West 
Africa made a Soviet-backed conventional attack on either unlikely. The risk of 
a more conventional attack would be influenced by ‘actions and reactions’ of 
Rhodesian and South African forces and whether the Soviet objectives ‘could 
be attained by merely continuing to support the revolutionary onslaught, which 
can be gradually stepped up should the situation become more favourable.’94
The OAU remained committed to the Lusaka declaration and the ‘total 
elimination of White Rule in southern Africa, the order of priority being 
Rhodesia, South-West Africa and finally the Republic of South Africa.’95 It was 
noted that the Defence Sub-Committee of the OAU Liberation Committee had 
adopted a report rejecting peaceful solutions to the Rhodesian crisis. Other 
rhetoric suggested an intensification of the armed struggle in ‘Zimbabwe and 
Namibia’. The more militant members of the OAU had been ‘buoyed up’ by 
the successes in Mozambique and Angola. ‘They’, it was noted, ‘have seen how 
“liberation” can be hastened by support from foreign external sources using 
heavy weapons.’96 However, the report was of the view that ‘at the moment 
there is no likelihood of a conventional war threat emanating from the OAU, 
or any of its components.’ This did not mean it could not be reviewed should 
the ‘terrorist’ campaign fail or should Mozambique, for instance, claim that its 
territorial integrity was threatened: ‘In this case the lesson of the Angolan civil 
war (the effectiveness of heavy weapons against lightly armed troops) may be 
applied and result in OAU countries sending military aid, or external forces 
(e.g. Cuban) may be ‘invited to assist in the attainment of OAU aims.’ Rhodesia 
would be most vulnerable to such an escalation.97 It was a grim prognosis, and 
one echoed in the minute of a British Foreign Office official, Peter Young:
Détente [in Southern Africa] is in ruins and, arguably, the threat to 
Namibia is now greater than it would have been if the MPLA had won 
sooner and South Africa had adopted the same attitude to them as they 
have done to FRELIMO. Certainly, there are now many more Cubans and 
a stronger Russian presence and influence which could threaten Namibia. 
But the important question is how all this will affect the Government’s 
internal policies and life within the Republic. I agree [...] that the present 
government are unlikely now to act logically and adopt more liberal 
policies towards the majority. The Nationalists are much more likely to  
 
 
93 Ibid, paragraph 5.
94 Ibid, paragraph 6.
95 Ibid, paragraph 8.
96 Ibid, paragraph 10.
97 Ibid, paragraphs 11–12.
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react the other way. But if Rhodesia fell violently and Mozambique became 
uncooperative, demands for change from the opposition may well compel 
Mr Vorster to alter course. Whatever happens, I think the historians will 
mark South Africa’s Angolan venture as a significant turning point away 
from peaceful evolution.98
 
Research for this article was made possible by grants from the Instituto Camões, the British 
Academy, and the Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences.
98 TNAUKKL, FCO, 51–425 P. M. H. Young Central and Southern African Department (FCO) to Mr 
Reid (FCO), 4 March 1976.
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